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Revisiting Credit Scoring Models in a Basel 2 Environment 
 
Edward I. Altman 
Abstract 
 
 This paper discusses two of the primary motivating influences on the recent 
development/revisions of credit scoring models, i.e., the important implications of 
Basel 2’s proposed capital requirements on credit assets and the enormous amounts 
and rates of defaults and bankruptcies in the US in 2001-2002.  Two of the more 
prominent credit scoring techniques, Z-Score and KMV’s EDF models, are 
reviewed.  Finally, both models are assessed with respect to default probabilities in 
general and in particular to the infamous Enron debacle.  In order to be effective, 
these and other credit risk models should be utilized by firms with a sincere credit 
risk culture. 
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1. Introduction 
 Around the turn of the new millennium, credit scoring models have been 
remotivated and given unprecedented significance by the stunning pronouncements of the 
new Basel Accord on credit risk capital adequacy - - the so-called Basel 2 (see Basel 
[1999] and [2001]).  Banks, in particular, and most financial institutions worldwide, have 
either recently developed or modified existing internal credit risk systems or are currently 
developing methods to conform with best practice systems and processes for assessing 
the probability of default (PD) and, possibly, loss-given-default (LGD) on credit assets of 
all types.  Coincidentally, defaults and bankruptcies reached unprecedented levels in the 
United States in 2001 and have continued in 2002.  Indeed, companies that filed for 
bankruptcy/reorganization under Chapter 11 with greater than $100 million liabilities 
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reached at least $240 billion in liabilities in 2001 (even with Enron’s understatement at 
the time of filing) and there were 39 firms that filed for protection under the US 
bankruptcy code with liabilities greater than $1 billion (see Panel A).  The pace of these 
large bankruptcies has continued in 2002 with another 23 firms of such great size filing in 
the first six months.  In the public bond arena, over $63 billion of U.S. domestic public 
debt defaulted in 2001 and the default rate on US high yield bonds was almost a record 
9.8% (see Altman and Arman [2002]).  And, in the first six months of 2002, the default 
rate is 6.97% and with WorldCom (July 2002) included, has already broken the record 
default rate for a single calendar year. 
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Panel A: Filings for Chapter 11
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This paper primarily discusses a model developed by the author over 30 years 
ago, the so-called Z-Score model, and its relevance to these recent developments.  In 
doing so, we will provide some updated material on the Z-Score model’s tests and 
applications over time as well as some modifications for greater applicability.  We also  
discuss an alternative widely used credit risk model, known as the KMV approach, and 
compare both KMV and Z-Score in the now infamous Enron (2001) bankruptcy debacle.   
The paper is not meant to be a comparison of all of the well known and readily available 
credit scoring models, such as Moody’s RiskCalc® or the ZETA® scoring model.  
Finally, we summarize a recent report (Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi, [2002]) on the 
association between aggregate PD and recovery rates on defaulted credit assets. 
 The major theme of this paper is that the assignment of appropriate default 
probabilities on corporate credit assets is a three-step process involving from the 
development of: 
(1) credit scoring models, 
(2) capital market risk equivalents - - usually bond ratings, and  
(3) assignment of PD1 and possibly LGDs on the credit portfolio.   
Our emphasis will be on step 1 and how the Z-Score model, (Altman, 1968), has become 
the prototype model for one of the three primary structures for determining PDs.  The 
other two structures involve either the bond rating process itself or option pricing capital 
market valuation techniques, typified by the KMV expected default frequency approach, 
(McQuown [1993], Kealhofer [2000], and KMV [2000]).  These techniques are also the 
                                                 
1 Some might argue that a statistical methodology can combine steps (1) and (2) where the output from (1) 
automatically provides estimates of PD.  This is one of the reasons that many “modelers” of late and major 
consulting firms prefer the logit-regression approach, rather than the discriminant model that this author 
prefers.  
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backbone of most credit asset value-at-risk (VaR) models.  In essence, we feel strongly 
that if the initial credit scoring model is sound and based on comprehensive and 
representative data, then the credit VaR model has a chance to be accurate and helpful for 
both regulatory and economic capital assignment.  If it is not, no amount of quantitative 
sophistication or portfolio analytic structures can achieve valid credit risk results. 
2. Credit Scoring Models 
 Almost all of the statistical credit scoring models that are in use today are 
variations on a similar theme.  They involve the combination of a set of quantifiable 
financial indicators of firm performance with, perhaps, a small number of additional 
variables that attempt to capture some qualitative elements of the credit process.  While 
this paper will concentrate on the quantitative measures, mainly financial ratios and 
capital market values, one should not underestimate the importance of qualitative 
measures in the process.2  Starting in the 1980’s, some sophisticated practitioners, and 
certainly many academicians, had been moving toward the possible elimination of ratio 
analysis as an analytical technique in assessing firm performance.  Theorists have 
downgraded arbitrary rules of thumb (such as company ratio comparisons) widely used 
by practitioners.  Since attacks on the relevance on ratio analysis emanate from many 
esteemed members of the scholarly world,3 does this mean that ratio analysis is limited to 
the world of “nuts and bolts?”  Or, has the significance of such an approach been 
unattractively garbed and therefore unfairly handicapped?  Can we bridge the gap, rather 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 Practitioners have reported that these so-called qualitative elements, that involve judgment on the part of 
the risk officer, can provide as much as 30-50% of the explanatory power of the scoring model. 
 
3 This is evidenced by the diminished emphasis, indeed almost the entire extinction, of chapters in 
introductory Corporate Finance textbooks on financial statement analysis and the information one can 
derive from these statements.  
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than sever the link, between traditional ratio analysis and the more rigorous statistical 
techniques that have become popular among academicians?  Along with our primary 
interest, credit risk assessment and financial distress prediction, we are also concerned 
with an assessment of ratio analysis as an analytical technique. 
3. Traditional Ratio Analysis 
 The detection of company operating and financial difficulties is a subject which 
has been particularly amenable to analysis with financial ratios.  Prior to the development 
of quantitative measures of company performance, agencies had been established to 
supply a qualitative type of information assessing the credit-worthiness of particular 
merchants.  (For instance, the forerunner of the well-known Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. was 
organized in 1849 in order to provide independent credit investigations).  Formal 
aggregate studies concerned with portents of business failure were evident in the 1930’s, 
(see Altman [1968] for several references).   
 Classic works in the area of ratio analysis and bankruptcy classification were 
performed by Beaver [1967, 1968].  His univariate analysis of a number of bankruptcy 
predictors set the stage for the multivariate attempts, by this author and others, which 
followed.  Beaver found that a number of indicators could discriminate between matched 
samples of failed and nonfailed firms for as long as five years prior to failure.  However, 
he questioned the use of multivariate analysis, although a discussant recommended 
attempting this procedure.  The Z-Score model, developed by this author at the same time 
(1966) that Beaver was working on his own thesis, did just that.  A subsequent study by 
Deakin [1972] utilized the same 14 variables that Beaver analyzed, but he applied them 
within a series of multivariate discriminant models. 
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 The aforementioned studies imply a definite potential of ratios as predictors of 
bankruptcy.  In general, ratios measuring profitability, liquidity, and solvency seemed to 
prevail as the most significant indicators.  The order of their importance is not clear since 
almost every study cited a different ratio as being the most effective indication of 
impending problems.4 
 Although these works established certain important generalizations regarding the 
performance and trends of particular measurements, the adaptation of the results for 
assessing bankruptcy potential of firms, both theoretically and practically, is 
questionable.  In almost every case, the methodology was essentially univariate in nature 
and emphasis was placed on individual signals of impending problems.  Ratio analysis 
presented in this fashion is susceptible to faulty interpretation and is potentially 
confusing.  For instance, a firm with a poor profitability and/or solvency record may be 
regarded as a potential bankrupt.  However, because of its above average liquidity, the 
situation may not be considered serious.  The potential ambiguity as to the relative 
performance of several firms is clearly evident.  The crux of the shortcomings inherent in 
any univariate analysis lies therein.  An appropriate extension of the previously cited 
studies, therefore, is to build upon their findings and to combine several measures into a 
meaningful predictive model.  In so doing, the highlights of ratio analysis as an analytical 
technique will be emphasized rather than minimized.  The questions are: 
(1)  which ratios are most important in detecting credit risk problems,  
(2) what weights should be attached to those selected ratios, and  
(3)  how should the weights be objectively established. 
                                                 
4 For a more in-depth discussion of other ratio based models, see Altman [1993].  
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4. Discriminant Analysis 
 After careful consideration of the nature of the problem and of the purpose of this 
analysis, we chose multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) as the appropriate statistical 
technique.  Although not as popular as regression analysis, MDA had been utilized in a 
variety of disciplines since its first application in 1930’s.  During those earlier years, 
MDA was used mainly in the biological and behavioral sciences.  After the late 1960’s, 
this technique became increasingly popular in the practical business world as well as in 
academia (see Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis and Sinkey, [1981]).   
MDA is a statistical technique used to classify an observation into one of several a 
priori groupings dependent upon the observation’s individual characteristics.  It is used 
primarily to classify/or make predictions in problems where the dependent variable 
appears in qualitative from, for example, male or female, bankrupt or nonbankrupt.  
Therefore, the first step is to establish explicit group classifications.  The number of 
original groups can be two or more.  Some analysts refer to discriminant analysis as 
“multiple” only when the number of groups exceeds two. 
 After the groups are established, data are collected for the objects in the groups; 
MDA in its most simple form attempt to derive a linear combination of these 
characteristics that “best” discriminates between the groups.  If a particular object, for 
instance, a corporation, has characteristics (financial ratios) that can be quantified for all 
of the companies in the analysis, the MDA determines a set of discriminant coefficients.  
When these coefficients are applied to the actual ratios, a basis for classification into one 
of the mutually exclusive groupings exists.  The MDA technique has the advantage of 
considering an entire profile of characteristics common to the relevant firms, as well as 
 10
the interaction of these properties.  A univariate study, on the other hand, can only 
consider the measurements used for group assignments one at a time. 
 Another advantage of MDA is the reduction of the analyst’s space dimensionally, 
that is, from the number of different independent variables to G-1 dimension(s), where G 
equals the number of original a priori groups.  The distressed classification and 
prediction analysis is concerned with two groups, consisting of bankrupt and nonbankrupt 
firms.  Therefore, the analysis is transformed into its simplest form: one dimension.  The 
discriminant function, of the form Z = V1X1 + V2X2 + VnXn transforms the individual 
variable values to a single discriminant score, or Z value, which is then used to classify 
the object where:  
  V1, V2, . . . . Vn = discriminant coefficients, and 
  X1, X2, . . . . Xn = independent variables 
 When utilizing a comprehensive list of financial ratios in assessing a firm’s 
bankruptcy potential, there is reason to believe that some of the measurements will have a 
high degree of correlation or collinearity with each other.  In my opinion, this aspect is 
not necessarily serious in discriminant analysis and it usually motivates careful selection 
of the predictive variables (ratios).  It also has the advantage of potentially yielding a 
model with a relatively small number of selected measurements that convey a great deal 
of information.  This information might very well indicate differences among groups, but 
whether or not these differences are significant and meaningful is a more important 
aspect of the analysis. 
 Perhaps the primary advantage of MDA in dealing with classification problems is 
the potential of analyzing the entire variable profile of the object simultaneously rather 
than sequentially examining its individual characteristics.  Just as linear and integer 
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programming have improved upon traditional techniques in capital budgeting, the MDA 
approach to traditional ratio analysis has the potential to reformulate the problem 
correctly.  Specifically, combinations of ratios can be analyzed together in order to 
remove possible ambiguities and misclassifications observed in earlier traditional ratio 
studies.  Critics of discriminant analysis point out that most, if not all, financial models 
using this technique violate several statistical requirements including multivariate 
normality and independence of the explanatory variables.  While valid concerns, my 
experience has shown that careful bounding of certain extreme value ratios will usually 
mitigate the normality problem and tests for the models’ robustness over time will 
determine if the independence violation is serious or not. 
5. Development of the Z-Score Model 
Sample Selection 
 The initial sample is composed of 66 corporations with 33 firms in each of the 
two groups.  The bankrupt (distressed) group (Group 1) is all manufacturers that filed a 
bankruptcy petition under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act from 1946 through 
1965.  A 20-year sample period is not the best choice since average ratios do shift over 
time.  Ideally, we would prefer to examine a list of ratios in time period t in order to make 
predictions about other firms in the following period (t+1).  Unfortunately, because of 
data limitations at that time, it was not possible to do this.  Recent “heavy” activity of 
bankruptcies now presents a more fertile environment (see Panel A).  Recognizing that 
this group is not completely homogeneous (due to industry and size differences), we 
attempted to make a careful selection of nonbankrupt (nondistressed) firms.  This group 
consists of a paired sample of manufacturing firms chosen on a stratified random basis.  
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The firms are stratified by industry and by size, with the asset size range restricted to 
between $1 and $25 million.  Firms in Group 2 were still in existence at the time of the 
analysis.  Also, the data collected were from the same years as those compiled for the 
bankrupt firms.  For the initial sample test, the data are derived from financial statements 
that are dated one annual reporting period prior to bankruptcy.  Some analysts, e.g., 
Shumway (2002), have criticized this “static” type of analysis but, again, we have found 
that the one financial statement prior to distress structure yields the most accurate post-
model building success. 
 An important issue is to determine the asset-size group to be sampled.  The 
decision to eliminate both the small firms (under $1 million in total assets) and the very 
large companies from the initial sample is due to the asset range of the firms in Group 1.  
In addition, the incidence of bankruptcy in the large-asset-size firm was quite rare prior to 
1966.  This changed starting in 1970 with the appearance of very large bankruptcies, e.g., 
Penn-Central R.R.  Large industrial bankruptcies also increased in appearance since 1978 
(the year of the existing Bankruptcy Code’s enactment), and in the 18-month period, 
January 2001 to June 2002, 62 companies with liabilities greater than $1 billion filed for 
protection under the U.S. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code (see Panel A). 
 A frequent argument is that financial ratios, by their very nature, have the effect 
of deflating statistics by size, and that therefore a good deal of the size effect is 
eliminated.  The Z-Score model, discussed below, has proven to be sufficiently robust to 
accommodate large firms as well as smaller ones. 
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Variable Selection 
 After the initial groups were defined and firms selected, balance sheet and income 
statement data were collected.  Because of the large number of variables that are 
potentially significant indicators of corporate problems, a list of 22 potentially helpful 
variables (ratios) were compiled for evaluation.  The variables are classified into five 
standard ratio categories, including liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and 
activity.  The ratios were chosen on the basis of their popularity in the literature and their 
potential relevancy to the study, and there were a few “new” ratios in this analysis. 
 From the original list of 22 variables, five were selected as doing the best overall 
job together in the prediction of corporate bankruptcy.  The contribution of the entire 
profile is evaluated and, since this process is essentially iterative, there is no claim 
regarding the optimality of the resulting discriminant function. 
 In order to arrive at a final profile of variables, the following procedures were 
utilized: 5  
(1) observation of the statistical significance of various alternative functions, 
including determination of the relative contributions of each independent 
variable; 
 
(2) evaluation of intercorrelations among the relevant variables;  
 
(3) observation of the predictive accuracy of the various profiles; and  
 
(4) judgment of the analyst. 
 
 The final discriminant function is given in Panel B. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Subsequent versions of discriminant model software include step-wise methods which self-select the 
variables that either enter (forward stepwise) or are excluded (backward) from the final variable profile.  
Our experience with these techniques is, while helpful, do not always result in superior classification and 
prediction results. 
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Panel B 
The Z-Score Model 
 
                 Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4  + 1.0 X5 
                              
                   X1 = working capital/total assets, 
                X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
                X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
                X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
                X5 = sales/total assets, and 
                  Z = overall Index or Score 
  
Note that the model does not contain a constant (Y-intercept) term.  This is due to 
the particular software utilized and, as a result, the relevant cutoff score between the two 
groups is not zero.  Many statistical software programs have a constant term which 
standardizes the cutoff score at zero if the sample sizes of the two groups are equal. 
X1, Working Capital/Total Asset (WC/TA) 
 The working capital/total assets ratio, frequently found in studies of corporate 
problems, is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to the total 
capitalization.  Working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities.  Liquidity and size characteristics are explicitly considered.  Ordinarily, 
a firm experiencing consistent operating losses will have shrinking current assets in 
relation to total assets.6  Two other liquidity ratios tested were the current ratio and the 
                                                 
6 It is true, however, that this ratio, indeed all liquidity measures using short term assets, can be misleading 
in that the ratio can be growing just when a firm is about to fail.  This fact highlights the problems of 
univariate measures of performance. 
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quick ratio.  These were found to be less helpful and subject to perverse trends for some 
failing firms. 
 In all cases, tangible assets, not including intangibles, are used. 
X2, Retained Earnings/Total Assets (RE/TA) 
 Retained earnings (RE) is the term used to describe the account that reports the 
total amount of reinvested earnings and/or losses of a firm over its entire life.  The 
account is also referred to as earned surplus.  It is conceivable that a bias would be 
created by a substantial reorganization or stock dividend and appropriate readjustments 
should, in the event of this happening, be made to the accounts. 
 This measure of cumulative profitability over time is what we referred to earlier 
as a “new” ratio.  The age of a firm and its use of leverage are implicitly considered in 
this ratio.  For example, a relatively young firm will probably show a low  retained 
earnings/total assets (RE/TA) ratio because it has not had time to build up its cumulative 
profits.  Therefore, it may be argued that the young firm is somewhat discriminated 
against in this analysis, and its chance of being classified as bankrupt is relatively higher 
than that of another older firm, ceteris paribus.  But, this is precisely the situation in the 
real world.  The incidence of failure is much higher in a firm’s earlier years [40–50% of 
all firms that fail do so in the first five years of their existence (Dun & Bradstreet, annual 
statistics)]. 
In addition, the RE/TA ratio measures the leverage of a firm.  Those firms with 
high RE, relative to TA, have financed their assets through retention of profits and have 
not utilized as much debt.  This ratio highlights either the use of internally generated 
funds for growth (low risk capital) or OPM (other people’s money) - higher risk capital. 
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X3, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
 This ratio is a measure of the true productivity of the firm’s assets, independent of 
any tax or leverage factors.  Since a firm’s ultimate existence is based on the earning 
power of its assets, this ratio appears to be particularly appropriate for studies dealing 
with credit risk.  Furthermore, insolvency in a bankrupt sense occurs when the total 
liabilities exceed a fair valuation of the firm’s assets with value determined by the 
earning power of the assets. 
X4, Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities (MVE/TL) 
 Equity is measured by the combined market value of all shares of stock, preferred 
and common, while liabilities include both current and long term.  The measure shows 
how much the firm’s assets can decline in value (measured by market value of equity 
plus debt) before the liabilities exceed the assets and the firm becomes insolvent.  We 
discussed this “comparison” long before the advent of the KMV approach (discussed 
below) and before Merton [1974] put these relationships into an option-theoretic 
approach to value corporate risky debt.  KMV used Merton’s work to springboard into 
their now commonly used credit risk measure - the Expected Default Frequency (EDF). 
 This ratio adds a market value dimension that most other failure studies did not 
consider.  At a later point, we will substitute the book value of net worth for the market 
value in order to derive a discriminant function for privately held firms (Z’) and for non-
manufacturers (Z”). 
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X5, Sales/Total Assets (S/TA) 
 The capital-turnover ratio is a standard financial ratio illustrating the sales 
generating ability of the firm’s assets.  It is one measure of management’s capacity in 
dealing with competitive conditions.  This final ratio is unique because it is the least 
significant ratio on an individual basis and on a univariate statistical significance test, it 
would not have appeared at all.  However, because of its relationship to other variables in 
the model, the sales/total assets (S/TA) ratio ranks high in its contribution to the overall 
discriminating ability of the model.  Still, there is a wide variation among industries and 
across countries in asset turnover, and we will specify an alternative model (Z”), without 
X5, at a later point. 
 Variable means were measured at one financial statement prior to bankruptcy and 
the resulting F-statistics were observed; variables X1 through X4 are all significant at the 
0.001 level, indicating extremely significant differences in these variables among groups.  
Variable X5 does not show a significant difference between groups and the reason for its 
inclusion in the variable profile is not apparent as yet.  On a strictly univariate level, all of 
the ratios indicate higher values for the nonbankrupt firms.  Also, all of the discriminant 
coefficients display positive signs, which is what one would expect.  Therefore, the 
greater a firm’s distress potential, the lower its discriminant score.  While it was clear that 
four of the five variables displayed significant differences between groups, the 
importance of MDA is its ability to separate groups using multivariate measures. 
 Once the values of the discriminant coefficients are estimated, it is possible to 
calculate discriminant scores for each observation in the samples, or any firm, and to 
assign the observations to one of the groups based on this score.  The essence of the 
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procedure is to compare the profile of an individual firm with that of the alternative 
groupings.  The comparisons are measured by either a chi-square value, or similar test, 
and group assignments are made based upon the relative proximity of the firms’ score to 
the various group centroids (means). 
Testing the Model on Subsequent Distressed Firm’s Samples 
 In three subsequent tests, we examined 86 distressed companies from 1969-1975, 
110 bankrupts from 1976-1995 and 120 from 1997-1999.  We found that the Z-Score 
model, using a cutoff score of 2.675, was between 82% and 94% accurate (Panel C).  In 
repeated tests, the accuracy of the Z-Score model on samples of distressed firms has been 
in the vicinity of 80-90%, based on data from one financial reporting period prior to 
bankruptcy.  The Type II error (classifying the firm as distressed when it does not go 
bankrupt), however, has increased substantially with as much as 15-20% of all firms and 
10% of the largest firms having Z-Scores below 1.81.  Using the lower bound of the 
zone-of-ignorance (1.81) is advocated as a more realistic cutoff Z-Score rather than the 
2.675 score.  The latter resulted in the lowest overall error in the original tests.  In 1999, 
the proportion of U.S. industrial firms that had Z-Scores below 1.81 was over 20%. 
 
Panel C 
 
Classification & Prediction Accuracy 
Z-Score (1968) Credit Scoring Model* 
 
 
Year Prior 
To Failure 
 
Original 
Sample (33) 
 
Holdout 
Sample (25) 
1969-1975 
Predictive 
Sample (86) 
1976-1995 
Predictive 
Sample (110) 
1997-1999 
Predictive 
Sample (120)
 
1 94% (88%) 96% (92%) 82% (75%) 85% (78%) 94% (84%) 
2 72% 80% 68% 75% 74% 
 
*Using 2.67 as cutoff score (1.81 cutoff accuracy in parenthesis) 
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6. Adaptation for Private Firms’ Application 
 Perhaps the most frequent inquiry that we have received from those interested in 
using the Z-Score model is, “What should we do to apply the model to firms in the 
private sector?”  Credit analysts, private placement dealers, accounting auditors, and 
firms themselves are concerned that the original model is only applicable to publicly 
traded entities (since X4 requires stock price data).  And, to be perfectly correct, the Z-
Score model is a publicly traded firm model and ad hoc adjustments are not scientifically 
valid.  For example, the most obvious modification is to substitute the book value of 
equity for the market value and then recalculate V4X4.   
A Revised Z-Score Model 
 Rather than simply insert a proxy variable into an existing model to calculate Z-
scores, we advocate a complete reestimation of the model, substituting the book values of 
equity for the Market Value in X4.  One expects that all of the coefficients will change 
(not only the new variable’s parameter) and that the classification criterion and related 
cutoff scores would also change.  That is exactly what happens. 
 The result of our revised Z-Score model with a new X4 variable is: 
 Z’ = 0.717(X1) + 0.847(X2) + 3.107(X3) + 0.420(X4) + 0.998(X5) 
 The equation now looks somewhat different than the earlier model; note, for 
instance, the coefficient for X1 went from 1.2 to 0.7.  But, the model looks quite similar 
to the one using Market Values.  The actual variable that was modified, X4, showed a 
coefficient change to 0.42 from 0.60; that is, it now has less a slightly lesser impact on 
the Z-Score.  X3 and X5 are virtually unchanged. 
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7. Bond Rating Equivalents  
 As noted in the Introduction, one of the main reasons for building a credit scoring 
model is to estimate the probability of default and loss given a certain level of risk 
estimation.  Although we all are aware that the rating agencies (e.g., Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch) are certainly not perfect in their credit risk assessments, in general it is felt that 
they do provide important and consistent estimates of default - mainly via their ratings.  
And, since there has been a long history and fairly large number of defaults which had 
ratings, especially in the United States, we can “profit” from this history by linking our 
credit scores with these ratings and thereby deriving expected and unexpected PDs and 
perhaps LGDs.  These estimates can be made for a fixed period of time from the rating 
date, e.g., one year, or on a cumulative basis over some investment horizon, e.g., five 
years.  And, they can be derived from the rating agencies themselves on an updated basis 
based on their so-called “static-pool” (S&P) or “dynamic-cohort” (Moody’s) approaches.  
An alternative is to use Altman’s [1989] “mortality rate” approach that is based on the 
expected default from the original issuance date. 
 With respect to non-rated entities, one can calculate a score, based on some 
available model, and link it to a bond rating equivalent.  The latter then can lead to the 
estimate of PD.  For example, in Panel D we list the bond rating equivalents for various 
Z-Score intervals based on average Z-Scores from 1995-1999 for bonds rated in their 
respective categories.  For example, one observes that triple-A bonds have an average Z-
Score of about 5.0, while singe-B bonds have an average score of 1.70.  The latter, 
incidentally, is in the distress zone and accounts for the largest of the high yield 
categories. 
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 The analyst can then observe the average one year PD from Moody’s/S&P for B 
rated bonds and find that it is in the 5% - 6% range (Moody’s [2002], S&P [2002]), or 
that the average one year after issuance PD is 2.45% (Altman & Arman, [2002]).  Note 
that the mortality rate’s first year’s PD is considerably lower that the PD derived from a 
“basket” of B-rated bonds which contain securities of many different ages and maturities.  
We caution the analyst to apply the correct PD estimate based on the qualities of the 
relevant portfolio of credit assets. 
 
 
Panel D 
 
Average Z-Scores by S&P Bond Rating 
1995 - 1999 
 
  
Average Annual 
Number of Firms 
 
 
Average 
Z-Score 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BB 
B 
CCC 
 
11 
46 
131 
107 
50 
80 
10 
 
 
5.02 
4.30 
3.60 
2.78 
2.45 
1.67 
0.95 
 
1.50 
1.81 
2.26 
1.50 
1.62 
1.22 
1.10 
Source:  Compustat Data Tapes 
 
8. A Further Revision – Adapting the Model for Non-Manufacturers and 
Emerging Markets  
 
The next modification of the Z-Score model analyzed the characteristics and 
accuracy of a model without X5 - sales/total assets.  We do this in order to minimize the 
potential industry effect that is more likely to take place when such an industry-sensitive 
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variable as asset turnover is included.  In addition, we have used this model to assess the 
financial health of non-U.S. corporates.  In particular, Altman, Hartzell and Peck [1995, 
1997] have applied this enhanced Z" Score model to emerging markets corporates, 
specifically Mexican firms that had issued Eurobonds denominated in US dollars.  The 
book value of equity was used for X4 in this case. 
 The classification results are identical to the revised five-variable model 
(Z’Score).  The new Z” Score model is: 
 Z” = 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4) 
Where Z”-Scores below 1.10 indicate a distressed condition. 
All of the coefficients for variables X1 to X4 are changed as are the group means 
and cutoff scores.  This particular model is also useful within an industry where the type 
of financing of assets differs greatly among firms and important adjustments, like lease 
capitalization, are not made.  In the emerging market (EM) model, we added a constant 
term of +3.25 so as to standardize the scores with a score of zero (0) equated to a D 
(default) rated bond.  See Panel E for the bond rating equivalents of this newer, Emerging 
Market (EM)-Score model. 
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Panel E 
US Bond Rating Equivalent Based on EM Score 
 
US Equivalent Rating Average EM Score 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
A+ 
A 
A- 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
B+ 
B 
B- 
CCC+ 
CCC 
CCC- 
D 
 
8.15 
7.60 
7.30 
7.00 
6.85 
6.65 
6.40 
6.25 
5.85 
5.65 
5.25 
4.95 
4.75 
4.50 
4.15 
3.75 
3.20 
2.50 
1.75 
0 
Source: In-Depth Data Corp.; average based on over 750 U.S. Corporates with rated debt 
outstanding: 1995 data. 
 
9. The ZETA Credit Risk Model 
In 1977, Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan [1977] constructed a second-
generation model with several enhancements to the original Z-Score approach.  The 
purpose of this study was to construct, analyze and test a new bankruptcy classification 
model that considers explicitly recent developments with respect to business failures.  
The new study also incorporated refinements in the utilization of discriminant statistical 
techniques.  The new model, which was called ZETA, was effective in classifying 
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bankrupt companies up to five years prior to failure on a sample of corporations 
consisting of manufacturers and retailers.7 
In addition to updating for newer bankruptcies across many industries and 
adjustments of the financial data for relevant accounting changes (eg, lease 
capitalization), the ZETA model tests included non-linear (e.g., quadratic) as well as 
linear discriminant models.  The non-linear model was more accurate in the original, test 
sample results but less accurate and reliable in holdout or out-of-sample testing. 
10. Macro Economic Impact and Loss Estimation 
 All of the aforementioned models are, in a sense, static in nature in that they can 
be applied at any point in time regardless of the current or expected performance of the 
economy and the economy’s impact on the key risk measures: 
(1) Probability of Default (PDs), and  
(2) Loss Given Default (LGDs).   
Aggregate PDs vary over time so that a firm with a certain set of variables will fail more 
frequently in poor economic times and vice-versa in good periods.  This systematic factor 
is not incorporated directly in the establishment of the scoring model in most cases.  
Some recent attempts have experimented with including variables which can capture 
these exogenous factors - like GDP growth.  Since GDP growth will be the same for the 
good firms as well as the distressed ones in the model development phase, it is necessary 
to be creative in including macro-impact variables.  One idea is to add an aggregate 
default measure for each year to capture a high or low risk environment and observe its 
explanatory power contribution in the failure classification model.  Such attempts have 
only achieved modest success to date. 
                                                 
7 Since the ZETA model is a proprietary effort, the parameters of the model cannot be disclosed. 
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Group Prior Probabilities, Error Costs and Model Efficiency 
An alternative approach is to adjust the various scores for different risk categories by 
including explicit estimates for the prior PD and the possible costs of the model’s errors.  
That is, assuming multi-normal populations and a common covariance matrix, the 
optimal cutoff score (Zc) could be calculated as:  
 
where q1, q2 = prior probability of bankrupt (q1) or nonbankrupt (q2), and C1, C11 = costs 
of Type I and Type II errors, respectively. 
 Further, if one wanted to compare the efficiency of the ZETA bankruptcy 
classification model with alternative strategies, the following cost function is appropriate 
for the expected cost of ZETA (ECZETA). 
where M12, M21 = are the observed Type I and Type II errors (misses) respectively, and 
N1, N2 =  are the number of observations in the bankrupt (N1) and non-bankrupt (N2) 
groups. 
 In our old tests, we implicitly assumed equal prior probabilities and equal costs of 
errors.  We are aware, however, of the potential bias involved in doing so.  Instead of 
attempting earlier to integrate probability priors and error costs, we have assumed equal 
estimates for each parameter, because to a great extent the two parameters neutralize each 
other, and it was much easier than attempting to state them precisely.  The following is 
our reasoning. 
112
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 The ‘correct’ one-year estimate of q1 for all firms is probably in the 0.02-0.06 
range.  Although the Z-Score model’s parameters are based on data from one year prior 
to bankruptcy, it is not specifically a one-year prediction model.  The procedure in this 
sense is a temporal.  In the final analysis, we simply do not know the precise general 
estimate of bankruptcy priors, since it will depend on the asset’s rating, its age, and the 
forecasting environment.  When we specify these variables, a more precise estimate is 
attained.  Yet, Basel 2 will require one-year estimates, at least for the time being. 
11. Cost of Classification Errors 
 Another input that is imperative to the specification of an alternative to the zero 
cutoff, accept-reject decision is the cost of errors classification.  In order to attempt to 
precise the cost component into an analysis of model efficiency, it is necessary to specify 
the decision-maker’s role.  An appropriate reference point is the commercial bank loan 
function.  The Type I error bankruptcy classification is analogous to that of an accepted 
loan that defaults and the Type II error to a rejected loan that would have paid-off 
successfully.  The latter is best assessed as a type of opportunity cost on the foregone 
investment. 
 The cost of a Type I error is analogous to the LGD estimate in modern credit risk 
models.  The first attempt to measure LGD was from Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 
[1977] based on a survey of banks’ loan loss files.  Since then, there have been a number 
of studies measuring the recovery rate on bonds (eg, Moody’s [Annual], Fitch [1997]), 
Altman & Kishore [1996] and a few on bank loans (eg, Moody’s [1996, 1998], Van de 
Castle and Keisman [2000].  For bonds, recovery can be measured at the time of default 
based on the price in the public market or upon emergence from the reorganization 
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process (usually Chapter 11).   Altman and Eberhart [1994] and Merrill Lynch [2002] 
report on the annualized return for investors who purchased just after default (the so-
called “vultures”) and stratify the results by seniority. 
 Most modern credit risk models and all of the VaR models (e.g., CreditMetrics), 
assume independence between PD and the recovery rate.  Altman, Brady, Resti and 
Sironi [2002] show, however, that this is an incorrect assumption and simulate the impact 
on capital requirements when you factor in a significant negative correlation between PD 
and recovery rates over time.  In particular, they find that in periods of high default rates 
on bonds, the recovery rate is very low relative to the average and losses can be expected 
to be greater (e.g., in 2000 and 2001).  Hu and Perraudin [2002] find similar results and 
Frye [2000] specified a systematic macro-economic influence on recovery rates.  This has 
caused serious concern among some central bankers of the potential procyclicality of a 
rating based approach, as is being recommended by Basel 2. 
 The bottom-line is that Basel 2 has made a real contribution by motivating an 
enormous amount of effort on the part of banks, regulators and others (eg, academics) to 
build credit risk models that involve scoring techniques, default and loss estimates, and 
portfolio approaches to the credit risk problem.  We now turn to an alternative approach 
to the Z-Score type models that we have been discussing. 
12. The Expected Default Frequency (EDF) Model 
 KMV Corporation, purchased by Moody’s in 2002, has created a procedure for 
estimating the (PD) default probability of a firm that is based conceptually on Merton’s 
[1974] option-theoretic, zero coupon, corporate bond valuation approach.  In three steps, 
it determines an EDF for a company.  In the first step, the market value and volatility of 
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the firm are estimated from the market value of its stock, the volatility of its stock, and 
the book value of its liabilities.  In the second step, the firm’s default point is calculated 
relative to the firm’s liabilities coming due over time.  Also, an expected firm value is 
determined from the current firm value.  Using these two values plus the firm's volatility, 
a measure is constructed that represents the number of standard deviations from the 
expected firm value to the default point (the distance to default).  Finally, a mapping is 
determined between the distance to default and the default rate based on the historical 
default experience of companies with different distance-to-default values. 
 In the case of private companies, for which stock price and default data are 
generally unavailable, KMV estimates the value and volatility of the private firm directly 
from its observed characteristics and values based on market comparables, in lieu of 
market values on the firm’s securities. 
 The starting point of the KMV model is the proposition that when the market 
value of a firm drops below a certain level, the firm will default on its obligations.  The 
value of the firm, projected to a given future date, has a probability distribution 
characterized by its expected value and standard deviation (volatility).  The area under 
the distribution below the book liabilities of the firm is the (PD) probability of default. 
 For a firm with publicly traded shares, the market value of equity may be 
observed.  The market value of equity may be expressed as the value of a call option, as 
follows: 
 Market value of equity = f (book value of liabilities, 
            market value of assets,    
            volatility of assets, time horizon) 
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 KMV uses a special form of the options pricing approach that they do not 
disclose.  To make their approach more concrete, the Black-Scholes options formula can 
be substituted for the function f.  This results in the following expression: 
 
Where E = is the option value of equity 
 e = is the market value of equity 
 D = is the book value of liabilities (strike price) 
 V = is the market value of assets 
 T  =  is the time horizon 
 r =  is the risk-free borrowing and lending rate 
          σa =  is the percentage standard deviation (volatility) of asset value 
 N = is the cumulative normal distribution function whose value is calculated at d1 
        and d2, where 
 
 The known variables are the market value of equity (E), volatility of equity (σe, 
estimated from historic data), book value of liabilities (D), and the time horizon (T).  The 
two unknowns are the market value of the assets (V) and the volatility of the assets (σa).  
Because there are two equations with two unknowns, a solution can be found.  This 
completes the first step. 
 Next, the expected asset value at the horizon and the default point are determined.  
An investor holding the asset would expect to get a payout plus a capital gain equal to the 
expected return.  The expected return is related to the systematic risk of the asset.  Using 
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a measure of the asset’s systematic risk, KMV determines an expected return based upon 
historic asset market returns.  This is reduced by the payout rate determined from the 
firm’s interest and dividend payments.  The result is the expected appreciation rate, 
which when applied to the current asset value, gives the expected future value of the 
assets. 
 In the previous analysis it was assumed that the firm would default when its total 
market value falls below the book value of its liabilities.  Based upon empirical analysis 
of defaults, KMV has found that the most frequent default point is at a firm value 
approximately equal to current liabilities plus 50% of long-term liabilities (25% was first 
tried but it did not work well). 
 Given the firm’s expected value at the horizon, and its default point at the 
horizon, KMV determines the percentage drop in the firm value that would bring it to the 
default point.  By dividing the percentage drop by the volatility, KMV controls for the 
effect of different volatilities. 
 The number of standard deviations that the asset value must drop in order to reach 
the default point is called the distance to default.  Mathematically, this can be expressed 
as 
)()(exp
int)(exptan
assetsofvolatilityassetsofvaluemarketected
podefaultassetsofvaluemarketecteddefaulttoceDis −=  
 
 The distance-to-default metric is a normalized measure and thus may be used for 
comparing one company with another.  A key assumption of the KMV approach is that 
all the relevant information for determining relative default risk is contained the expected 
market value of assets, the default point, and the asset volatility.  Differences due to 
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industry, national location, size, and so forth are assumed to be included in these 
measures, notably the asset volatility. 
 Distance to default is also an ordinal measure akin to a bond rating, but it still 
does not tell you what the default probability is.  In order to extend this risk measure to a 
cardinal or a probability measure, KMV uses historical default experience to determine 
an expected default frequency as a function of distance to default.  It does this by 
comparing the calculated distances to default and the observed actual default rate for a 
large number of firms from their proprietary database.  A smooth curve fitted to those 
data yields the EDF as a function of the distance to default.  
13. The Enron Example: Models Versus Ratings 
 We have examined two of the more popularly found credit scoring models - the 
Z-Score model and KMV’s EDF - and in both cases a bond rating equivalent can be 
assigned to a firm.  Many commentators have noted that quantitative credit risk 
measurement tools can and have saved banks and other “investors” from losing 
substantial amounts or at least reducing their risk exposures.  A prime example is the 
recent Enron debacle, whereby billions of dollars of equity and debt capital have been 
lost.  The following illustrates the potential savings involved from a disciplined credit 
risk procedure. 
 On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation filed for protection under Chapter 11 
and became the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history - with reported liabilities at 
the filing of over $31 billion and revised liabilities of over $60 billion!  Using data that 
was available to investors over the period 1997-2001, Panel F (from Saunders & Allen 
[2002]) shows the following: KMV’s EDF, with its heavy emphasis on Enron’s stock 
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price, rated Enron AAA as of year-end 1999, but then indicated a fairly consistent rating 
equivalent deterioration resulting in a BBB rating one year later and then a B- to CCC+ 
rating just prior to the filing.  Altman’s Z”Score model (the four variable model for non-
manufacturers) had Enron as BBB as of year-end 1999 - the same as the rating agencies - 
but then showed a steady deterioration to B as of June, 2001.  So, both quantitative tools 
were issuing a warning long before the bad news hit the market.  Although neither 
actually predicted the bankruptcy, these tools certainly could have provided an 
unambiguous early warning that the rating agencies were not providing (their rating 
remained at BBB until just before the bankruptcy).  Both models were using a vast under-
estimate of the true liabilities of the firm.  To be fair, the rating agencies were constrained 
in that a downrating from BBB could have been the death-signal for a firm like Enron 
which relied on its all important investment grade rating in its vast counterparty trading 
and structured finance transactions.  An objective model, based solely on publicly 
available accounting and market information, is not constrained in that the analyst is free 
to follow the signal or to be motivated to dig-deeper into what on the surface may appear 
to be a benign situation. 
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EDF Equivalent
Rating
CC
CCC
B
BB
BBB
A
AA
AAA
Enron Credit Risk Measures
Panel F
Source:     Saunders & Allen [2002]. 
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14. Conclusion 
In the Enron case, and many others that we are aware of, although tools like Z-
Score and EDF were available, losses were still incurred by even the most sophisticated 
investors and financial institutions.  Having the models is simply not enough!  What is 
needed is a “credit-culture” within these financial institutions, whereby credit risk tools 
are “listened-to” and evaluated in good times as well as in difficult situations. 
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